We propose a nonce misuse-resistant message authentication scheme called EHE (Encrypt-Hash-Encrypt). In EHE, a message-dependent polynomial is evaluated at the point which is an encrypted nonce. The resulting polynomial hash value is encrypted again and becomes an authentication tag. We prove the prf-security of the EHE scheme and extend it to two authenticated encryption modes which follow the "encrypt-thenauthenticate" paradigm. T = f X (H) + π(S).
Introduction
Let F be a finite field of N 1 elements. Polynomial hashing over F is defined as follows: A message X to be hashed is transformed into a polynomial f X (λ) ∈ F[λ], this polynomial is evaluated at some point H ∈ F, the result of evaluation becomes a hash value of X. Further we suppose that the polynomial f X has positive degree, its constant term equals 0, different messages are transformed into different polynomials. Usually the message X is divided into blocks which determine the coefficients of f X . The shorter X, the lower the degree of f X . Let messages be rather short and deg f X ≤ d N . If H is chosen uniformly at random from F, then the hash values of different messages X and X coincide with only small probability:
This simple fact supports security of message authentication schemes based on polynomial hashing. Possibly the most well-known scheme of this type was proposed by M. Wegman and J. Carter in [11] and refined by V. Shoup in [9] . Following [1] , we call it WCS, by the first letters of the authors' names. The WCS scheme was successfully used in GCM, a widely deployed authenticated encryption (AE) mode. GCM was introduced in [5] and standardized in [2] . Recall that an AE mode augments an authentication scheme with encryption one.
Let us describe WCS with inessential simplifications. The point H becomes a random secret key. The additional key is a random permutation π acting on F. An authentication tag T (a key-dependent hash value) of X is calculated using a unique nonce S ∈ F as follows:
To instantiate WCS, π is usually chosen as an encryption permutation of some block cipher and H is usually a result of encryption of a fixed element c ∈ F using π. This is how WCS is instantiated in GCM.
The uniqueness of nonces is essential. Indeed, if the tags T = f X (H) + π(S) and T = f X (H) + π(S ) are calculated with X = X but S = S , then an adversary can effectively determine H as one of the roots of the polynomial equation f X (H) − f X (H) = T − T . After determining H, the adversary determines π(S) = T − f X (H) and then can calculate the tag T = f X (H) + π(S) of any X .
The described situation, the significant loss of security after some event, we call the security collapse. Different message authentication schemes collapse in different ways. For example, in the schemes of type CBC-MAC (see, for example, [8] ) an internal collision, which occurs after processing about √ N message blocks, allows to perform a selective forgery, that is, to forge tags of special messages. For comparison, WCS collapses much more seriously: universal forgery after only a single nonce repetition.
In the mentioned standard [2] , nonce repetition is considered as a misuse of GCM. The standard proposes to solve the misuse problem at the crypto-engineering layer. But it is preferable to solve such problems cryptographically, by designing authentication schemes or AE modes which security does not collapse so much after nonce repetition. Such schemes and modes are called nonce misuse-resistant.
The GCM mode follows the "encrypt-then-authenticate" paradigm. In this paradigm the nonce misuse-sensitive scheme WCS cannot provide misuse-resistance of the whole mode. Resistance appears if we turn the paradigm into "authenticate-then-encrypt" keeping WCS. This approach was successfully implemented in the GCM-SIV mode [3] . Unfortunately, due to the paradigm shift, GCM-SIV requires an additional pass over the processed data.
In this paper we propose a different approach: strengthening the basic message authentication scheme. In Section 2 we introduce a nonce misuse-resistant scheme called EHE. We justify its security and then, in Section 3, discuss details of its instantiation based on a block cipher. In Section 4 we extend EHE to AE modes which preserve the "encrypt-then-authenticate" paradigm. We denote these modes as AE [EHE] . Note that the first mode was standardized in [10] under the name belt-datawrap. We accompanied it with a rather cumbersome proof of security. In this paper the proof is drastically simplified.
The EHE scheme
In the proposed EHE scheme, a key is a pair of permutations π 1 and π 2 acting on F. A message X to be authenticated is represented by a polynomial f X which satisfies the previous restrictions. A tag T is calculated using a nonce S ∈ F as a value of the following function: ϕ[π 1 , π 2 ](X, S) = π 2 (f X (π 1 (S))).
In this function we start with the permutation π 1 , continue with polynomial hashing and finish with the permutation π 2 . The permutations mean block encryption, so we deal with the Encrypt-Hash-Encrypt cascade or EHE in short.
In contrast to WCS, the polynomials f X are evaluated not in a fixed point H = π(c) but generally in different points H = π 1 (S). It is well known (see for example [4, Theorem 6.13]) that the polynomial g(λ, λ ) = f X (λ) − f X (λ ) ∈ F[λ, λ ] has at most deg g · N = max(deg f X , deg f X )N roots in F 2 . Therefore, for independent random H, H , each uniformly distributed over F, and for arbitrary messages X, X it holds that:
This bound forms the basis of our security proofs of EHE. More precisely, we use the slightly stronger bound:
It followed from the fact that the polynomial g(λ, λ ) has at most d(N − 1) roots (H, H ) such that H = H . Indeed, the substitution λ = λ+µ transforms g into a polynomial g (λ, µ). The number of the suitable roots of g is the number of roots of g with a nonzero last coordinate. This coordinate can be chosen in N − 1 ways. Each choice µ = c yields the univariate polynomial g (λ, c) which has at most d roots.
Let us justify the prf-security of EHE, that is, the indistinguishability of ϕ[π 1 , π 2 ] from a truly random (ideal) message authentication function. The indistinguishability means that ϕ[π 1 , π 2 ] is pseudorandom (it "looks" like random) or prf in short. Let an adversary (a probabilistic algorithm) have access to a message authentication oracle G which on a query (X, S) gives a response T . The oracle implements either the function ϕ[π 1 , π 2 ] (a real implementation) or a truly random function ρ (an ideal implementation). In the real implementation, the permutations π 1 , π 2 are chosen independently uniformly at random from the set of all permutations on F. In the ideal implementation, the oracle, given a new query, chooses a response T uniformly at random from F independently of previous responses. The adversary can make arbitrary queries, can collect and analyze the corresponding responses. Its task is to determine which function G implements. The adversary returns
The quality of A's distinguishing capabilities is characterized by the advantage
The probabilities here are over the random tape of A and over the random choice of π 1 , π 2 and ρ. If Adv prf EHE (A) is small then the adversary is hard to distinguish ϕ[π 1 , π 2 ] from ρ. To estimate Adv prf EHE (A), we need the following auxiliary result related to factorial powers:
Lemma. Let N be a positive integer and q be a non-negative integer such that q ≤ N . Then
Proof. Consider three fractions:
The sum of their denominators is 3N . Therefore, the product of the denominators does not exceed N 3 , the product of the fractions is not less than 1/N 3 , and
from which the result follows.
Theorem 1. Let EHE be built over a field of N elements. Let an adversary A make at mostueries (X, S) and messages X in these queries be such that deg f X ≤ d. Then
Proof. Let (X 1 , S 1 ), . . . , (X q , S q ) be different queries and T 1 , . . . , T q be different elements of F (potential responses). It is sufficient to prove that
Indeed, then using the H-coefficients technique [7] or, more precisely, Theorem 1 from [6] , we obtain
Introduce the event D 1 that all Y i are distinct and the event D 2 that π 2 (Y i ) = T i for each i. Let us estimate the probabilities P {D 1 } and P {D 2 | D 1 }. They are correspondingly determined by the random choice of π 1 and π 2 .
The estimates (1), (2) imply
regardless of whether S i and S j coincide or not. Indeed, if S i = S j then H i = H j is uniformly distrubuted over F and (1) works. If S i = S j then (H i , H j ) is uniformly distributed over 
Next, using Lemma, we have
which was to be proven.
The theorem implies that the EHE authentication remains prf-secure as long as the number of messages processed by a single key is well below N/d. The prf-security is the strongest property of the message authentication schemes. In particular, it implies the security against forgery attacks. In these attacks an adversary interacts with G = ϕ[π 1 , π 2 ] making arbitrary queries and getting corresponding responses. The adversary's aim is to predict a response to a query that has not been made yet.
Both permutations π 1 and π 2 in EHE are necessary. Confirm this fact in the context of the forgery attacks. If π 1 is omitted, then an adversary can effectively find different messages X and X with the same hash values f X (S) and f X (S). Then using a tag T = π 2 (f X (S)) of X the adversary determines the tag T = T of X without a query. If π 2 is omitted, then an adversary finds H = π 1 (S) from T = f X (H) and determines the tag T = f X (H) of arbitrary X , again without a query.
The theorem means that EHE preserves security even if nonces repeat. In principle, EHE can be used with a fixed nonce S = c. But in this case, the security is collapsed in the following sense. As soon as an adversary finds a collision of tags T and T of different messages X and X , it obtains the polynomial equiation f X (H) = f X (H) in H = π 1 (c). After determining H, the adversary constructs a new message X such that f X (H) = f X (H) and determines its tag T = T without a query. Note that the collision T = T is expected to occur and EHE is expected to collapse after about at least N/d queries to the authentication oracle. This fact does not contradict to the bound of the theorem.
To determine H the adversary first finds roots of the polynomial f X (λ) − f X (λ) (let us ignore the time required) and then checks each of them to localize the right one. To check a root it is necessary to make a special query, for example, (X , S). Let M be the number of different roots. If M is large, then the number of check queries is large too. But if M is small, then the collision probability M N is small too. Therefore, regardless of M , the check-time to collision-probability ratio for the pair (X, X ) is of order N .
The situation changes drastically if nonces do not repeat. In this case the collision T = T means that (H, H ) is a root of the bivariate polynomial g(λ, λ ) = f X (λ) − f X (λ ). Let g have M different roots. There are at least M 2d different coordinates of these roots and time to check is of lower order M d . The collision occurs with the probability M N (N −1) and the check-time to collision-probability ratio of the pair (X, X ) is of lower order N 2 d , that is, it dramatically increases comparing to the previous situation.
Instantiation
Instead of two secret permutations, it is convenient to use only one, say π, and derive π 1 and π 2 from it. We are interested in two variants (instantiation templates) of such deriving: (π 1 , π 2 ) = (π, π) and (π 1 , π 2 ) = (π 2 , π). The first template is clearly natural, the second one will be used in the following section while extending EHE to AE[EHE]. Let, as usual, π be chosen uniformly at random from the set of all permutations on F. Theorem 2. Let EHE be built over a field of N elements with (π 1 , π 2 ) = (π, π). Let an adversary A make at mostueries (X, S) and messages X in these queries be such that deg f X ≤ d. Then
Proof. Let us modify the previous proof. Now the event D 1 suppresses not only the collisions Y i = Y j but also the collisions Y i = S j and T i = H j . Additional restrictions mean that every pair (Y i , T i ) is fresh, that is, π 2 can map Y i to T i despite the facts that H j = π 1 (S j ) and π 1 = π 2 .
There are q 2 additional collisions of each type, their probabilities:
In whole,
Having q 1 ≤ q different nonces S i and, therefore, q 1 different pairs (a preimage S i , an image H i ) of π 1 = π, there are (N − q 1 ) [q] ways to determine images of π 2 = π for the q additional preimages Y 1 , . . . , Y q and only one of these ways is suitable, namely T 1 , . . . , T q . Therefore,
2N .
Combining the bounds on P {D 1 } and P {D 2 | D 1 } completes the proof.
The permutation π may be interpreted as an ideal implementation of a block encryption oracle E. It is an internal oracle of EHE to which A does not have a direct access. A real implementation of E is a permutation F K uniformly at random chosen from a multiset F of permutations acting on F. This multiset is called a block cipher. The index K above is a random key of this cipher. Let EHE[F ] be the EHE scheme with the described instantiation of E.
The advantage of A against EHE[F ] is defined and estimated in the following way:
The last summand characterizes the quality of distinguishing of E, that is, differentiating between its real implementation F K and its ideal implementation π. The advantage of an adversary B which distinguish E is defined similarly to the advantage of A:
Let Adv prp F (t, q) be the maximum of Adv prp F (B) over all B which run in time at most t and make at mostueries to E.
The adversary B can use A to distinguish E. To do this, B simulates the oracle G = ϕ[E, E] which responses E(f X (E(S))) to (X, S) the adversary determines making two queries to E and one polynomial hashing. The adversary B grants A access to the simulated oracle, waits for the output from A and returns this output as its own. The simulation of G needs q * = 2q queries to E and time t * = O(qd).
If A runs in time t, then
and, in whole, Adv prf EHE[F ] (A) ≤ Adv prf EHE (A) + Adv prp F (q * , t + t * ). The arguments above are standard in provable security. The last estimate can be used to continue all our further theorems. In such a continuation, one should only refine q * (the total number of A's indirect queries to the internal oracle E) and t * (time to simulate G over E).
The AE[EHE] modes
The permutation π can be used not only to instantiate EHE, but also to manage encryption, that is, to extend EHE to AE [EHE] . In this section we propose two modes of authenticated encryption based on EHE. In both modes plaintexts and ciphertexts are considered as words in the alphabet F.
A plaintext is encrypted in the counter mode using a full-cycle permutation next acting on F. A nonce S is used to calculate H = π(S) and then the sequence C 1 = next(H), C 2 = next(C 1 ) = next 2 (H), . . . of counters. The encrypted counters Γ k = π(C k ) are added to the plaintext symbols during encryption or subtracted from the ciphertext symbols during decryption. An adversary can get π(C k ) (it can subtract a known plaintext from an intersected ciphertext) but not C k .
The obtained ciphertext and arbitrary associated data form a message X which is authenticated using EHE. Since deg f X ≤ d, the length of the plaintext cannot exceed d and at most d symbols Γ k are sufficient for encryption.
We cannot justify the security of AE [EHE] in the general case if the template (π 1 , π 2 ) = (π, π) is used. It is due to possible similarities between f X and next k . For example, if f X and next k act identically, then an adversary can predict T = π(f X (π(S))) using Γ k = π(next k (π(S))) = T . We should either impose restrictions on next or change the template.
Start with the second option. The simplest suitable template is (π 1 , π 2 ) = (π 2 , π). It separates a preimage π 2 (S) of f X from a preimage π(S) of next k and makes similarities between f X and next k ineffective. The whole AE[EHE] mode with the new template can be depicted as follows: S
next π next π f X π Theorem 3. Let EHE be built over a field of N elements with (π 1 , π 2 ) = (π 2 , π). Let an adversary A make at mostueries (X, S) and messages X in these queries be such that deg f X ≤ d. Let the adversary in addition to each response T receive at most d first elements of the sequence Γ 1 = π(next(π(S))), Γ 2 = π(next 2 (π(S))), . . . and let r be the total number of such elements. Then
Proof. Let us modify the proof of Theorem 2. Denote Z i = π(S i ), H i = π(Z i ), C i,k = next k (Z i ), Γ i,k = π(C i,k ). In the event D 1 we now suppress the following collisions: collision quantity (upper bound) probability (upper bound)
The imposed restrictions guarantee the freshness of the pairs (Y i , T i ). Processing the last two columns of the table, we obtain
Repeating the estimation technique of the previous proof, we get the required result.
The instantiation template (π 1 , π 2 ) = (π, π) is preferable than (π 1 , π 2 ) = (π 2 , π) because it requires 1 less encryption. As we said before, to securely use the template (π 1 , π 2 ) = (π, π), it is necessary to impose restrictions on next. These restrictions should impede the collisions of the form f X (H) = next k (H ) or even the form f X (H) = next k (H ), H = H .
In this connection, call the permutation next (d, δ)-uniform, if for any suitable f X with deg f X ≤ d and each k = 1, . . . , d it holds that
Here H and H are independent random, each uniformly distributed over F.
Example. Consider an affine permutation aff : H → αH + β, α, β ∈ F \ {0}. If α is the multiplicative unit of F, then aff is (d, 1)-uniform, the best we can get, but it is a full-cycle only if F is prime. For arbitrary F the permutation aff turns into an almost-full-cycle if α is primitive. Indeed, in this case aff decomposes into a cycle of length N − 1 and a fixed point β/(1 − α). The probability to fall into the sole fixed point during encryption is negligible and aff can be used in the counter mode without meaningful loss of security.
Theorem 4. Let EHE be built over a field of N elements with (π 1 , π 2 ) = (π, π). Let an adversary A make at mostueries (X, S) and messages X in these queries be such that deg f X ≤ d. Let the adversary in addition to each response T receive at most d first elements of the sequence Γ 1 = π(next(π(S))), Γ 2 = π(next 2 (π(S))), . . . and let r be the total number of such elements. Let next be (d, δ)-uniform. Then
Adv prf EHE (A) ≤ q(3q + 2rδ − 1)d + 2q 2 + 2qr 2N 1 + q(q − 1) 2N .
Proof. Let us modify the proof of Theorem 2 again. Denote C i,k = next k (H i ), Γ i,k = π(C i,k ) and suppress the following collisions: collision quantity (upper bound) probability (upper bound)
from which the required result follows.
To fully justify the security of the proposed AE[EHE] modes, we need to show that it is hard to distinguish from random not only the tags T but also the symbols Γ k (provided that the nonces S do not repeat). Technically, it can be quite easily done by rebuilding the proofs of Theorems 3 and 4. We leave such rebuilding outside the scope of this paper.
